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Abstract: Risk assessment methods are widely used in aviation, but have not been demonstrated for 
visual inspection of aircraft engine components. The complexity in this field arises from the variety 
of defect types and the different manifestation thereof with each level of disassembly. A new risk 
framework was designed to include contextual factors. Those factors were identified using Bowtie 
analysis to be criticality, severity, and detectability. This framework yields a risk metric that de-
scribes the extent to which a defect might stay undetected during the inspection task, and result in 
adverse safety outcomes. A simplification of the framework provides a method for go/no-go deci-
sion-making. The results of the study reveal that the defect detectability is highly dependent on 
specific views of the blade, and the risk can be quantified. Defects that involve material separation 
or removal such as scratches, tip rub, nicks, tears, cracks, and breaking, are best shown in airfoil 
views. Defects that involve material deformation and change of shape, such as tip curl, dents on the 
leading edges, bents, and battered blades, have lower risk if edge views can be provided. This re-
search proposes that many risk assessments may be reduced to three factors: consequence, likeli-
hood, and a cofactor. The latter represents the industrial context, and can comprise multiple sub-
factors that are application-specific. A method has been devised, including appropriate scales, for 
the inclusion of these into the risk assessment. 
Keywords: risk assessment; risk management; aviation safety; gas turbine engine; blade inspection; 
MRO; aircraft maintenance; contextual factors 
 
1. Introduction 
Gas turbine aircraft engines are inspected at regular intervals, or after a known inci-
dent (e.g., bird strike). While maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) of engines is cru-
cial for flight safety, it is predominantly performed by human operators who are prone to 
error. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) reported that maintenance and 
inspection errors are under the top three causes of aircraft accidents and that in 26% of 
the cases, a maintenance-caused event started the event chain [1,2]. According to Federal 
Aviation Authority (FAA) records, maintenance was involved in 27.4% of fatalities and 
6.8% of incidents [1]. Furthermore, it was reported that component or structural failures 
are the primary root-cause for maintenance-related incidents and that it most likely occurs 
at the engine. 
In aircraft engine maintenance, the first inspection made is by boroscopic means, 
whereby a borescope is inserted into the engine (typically while on the wing) and the 
rotating parts are inspected. The inspector has to examine each blade for indications of 
damage. If a defect is found, it has to be recorded and quantified as to acceptability. The 
inspection has to be made in a difficult environment with several constraints, such as lim-
ited space for the operator, restricted views, restricted lighting, limited pixel resolution, 
boredom, distraction, and time pressure [3]. 
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A sample borescope photograph image is presented in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Typical borescope view. 
Borescopy is the first in a sequence of several inspection activities. In a semi-manual, 
operator-dependent, time-consuming, and tedious procedure [4], the inspector has to 
identify a wide variety of defects, with different severity degrees and locations under dif-
ferent angles [5]. This activity informs the decision whether to let the engine continue fly-
ing, reduce the inspection interval to check for propagation of the defects over time, or 
remove it for maintenance. Committing the engine to a (costly) teardown process enables 
other means of inspection, both visual and other non-destructive testing (NDT) methods, 
to be applied. 
Once an engine is committed to repair, it is disassembled and further visual inspec-
tions occur. While the initial borescope inspection is limited in what can be seen, once the 
engine is disassembled, the blades can be visually inspected individually and in better 
conditions. The most detailed inspection is the examination of disassembled parts. This is 
called the ‘on-bench’ or ‘piece-part’ inspection, and is the subject of the present paper. 
This inspection is done visually, and allows the blades to be individually examined from 
any angle, with excellent lighting, and the use of optical magnification if warranted (refer 
to Figure 2). At this point, the decision will be made as to whether the blade may be re-
turned to service in its current condition, or diverted to the repair or scrapping processes. 
 
Figure 2. On-bench inspection of a single blade. 
The inspection process is prone to human error tendencies as well as lack of accuracy, 
reliability, subjectivity, consistency, and repeatability, among other factors [6–9]. Missing 
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a defect (false negative) during an inspection task anywhere on this chain has the potential 
to lead to catastrophic engine failure, hence risk of damage to the engine and fuselage 
[10,11], as well as to severe harm to passengers or even fatalities [12,13]. On the other hand, 
a false positive detection may commit the engine to a needless repair process that is costly 
in time and financial utility. Hence, visual inspection tasks introduce key decision points 
into the maintenance process, with far-reaching consequences. 
Furthermore, engine maintenance is a complex, time-consuming, and expensive task 
and one shop visit can create costs equivalent to the engine list price [5,14–16]. This creates 
a competitive pressure between MRO service providers, whereby the one with the lowest 
price and shortest turn-around time wins the order. 
Increasing fleet sizes, heavy growth of the MRO industry, and shortage of trained 
personnel at the same time creates additional time pressure to meet the demand [17]. This 
is highly critical, as time pressure must not have any negative impact on the inspection 
quality, which affects passenger safety. It further contributes to human error and the risk 
of missing a critical defect. 
Since 90% of inspections in aircraft maintenance are done visually [8,14,18], there is 
a need to understand the risk inherent in such inspection process. In this paper, we de-
velop a risk framework specifically for visual inspection tasks of geometrically complex 
parts such as blades. While the subject under examination is inspection of blades, it should 
be pointed out that much of the safety of aviation systems depends on the inspection vig-
ilance of human operators during manufacture, operation, and maintenance of the tech-
nical system. 
2. Literature Review 
We briefly review the risk management literature and related question of how risk 
might be determined in the specific activity of visual inspection. 
2.1. Extended Risk Constructs Using n-Tuples 
The term ‘risk’ is somewhat ambiguous as it has multiple definitions and methods 
for determination [19]. Thus, depending on the context, risk may be: uncertainty, potential 
loss, consequences, probability of an undesired event, or effect of uncertainty on objec-
tives. It is also often a combined metric, e.g., Consequences or damage + Uncertainty, or 
Probability + Consequences. 
Over time, the interpretation of the ISO 31000 risk management [20] concept has 
tended to dominate. This standard defines risk as the ‘effect of uncertainty on the possi-
bility of achieving the organization’s objectives’. Furthermore, it provides a specific mech-
anism to determine risk. It partitions risk into two dimensions: consequence, and likeli-
hood of that occurring. Then, these are combined into a risk metric. The combination may 
be done in two ways: (a) simply multiplying consequence and likelihood, if both are nu-
meric scales, or (b) using a correlation matrix or map. Thresholds for acceptable risk are 
then applied, to categorise the risks and prioritise them based on acceptability, practical-
ity, response time, enforceability, durability, cost–benefit ratio, compliance with legisla-
tion, and possible treatment. The expected efficacy of the treatments can be estimated by 
calculating the ‘residual’ risk after treatment, and this too can be evaluated for acceptabil-
ity. The results are tabulated in the ‘risk register’. The overall outcome of the process is 
that it provides a methodology whereby organisations can show due diligence towards a 
systematic assessment of risk, and justify rationing resources to treat the more important 
risks. Note that in ISO 31000, the concept of risk includes both threats and opportunities, 
hence the treatments are prevention of threats and capture of opportunities respectively, 
but here we are primarily interested in the threat component. 
The ISO 31000 construct of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶 × 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜 has the benefit of providing a 
common method for the determination of risk. Nonetheless, it has limitations. In the gen-
eral application of risk management, the scales are almost always subjective and highly 
variable between organisations [21,22]. Different analysts could even estimate different 
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outcomes with the same scale, contributing towards the inconsistency. Even technical sys-
tems, like piece-part inspection, are prone to qualitative assessments of risk as not every 
quality parameter can be measured and quantified, at least not in real operational settings. 
Moreover, in reality, failure outcomes are not single consequences but rather a chain of 
progressive deterioration of the system with multiple opportunities to intervene. The 
method does not accommodate this—it assumes an equifinality to consequence (and like-
lihood) that may be unjustifiable in complex failure sequences. Moreover, the two factors 
do not provide sufficient granularity for many engineering situations. 
In an attempt to incorporate other conditional factors, the literature shows diverse 
ways of achieving this. A common but highly variable approach is to extend the risk met-
ric to encompass a third or more factors. The most common ones were vulnerability [23–
26], detectability [27–30], manageability [29,31–35], and time [29,36–39]. Other more ap-
plication-specific factors that have been added to the risk equations include preventability 
[35], layers of protection [40], resilience [41], volatility [39], experience [42], knowledge 
[43–45], social impact [46] and coping capacity [47,48], performance-shaping factors [49], 
and human factors [50]. Many of these methods start by defining the consequences and 
likelihood and then adding the other factors. Other methods augment this by instead fo-
cusing on the events leading up to the consequences, typically using a correlation ap-
proach such as Quality Function Deployment (QFD) and related extensions [51–54]. In-
variably, the objective is to quantify the risk for a specific situation or context. A detailed 
list of risk equations with a contextual variable is shown in Table 1. As this shows, there 
is no general approach capturing all the different approaches. 





Other Metrics Application 
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Marin-Ferrer et al. 
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2.2. Specific Frameworks for Visual Inspection Risk 
Several approaches attempt to incorporate detection in the risk assessment of failure. 
The most common approach is the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) [57,58], which 
analyses the components of a system and how these can fail, and assigns a consequence to 
each of them. On an operational level, the failure modes are typically processes, thus the 
resulting framework is Process Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (PFMEA) [58,59], while in 
the design stage, it is called Design Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (DFMEA) [58,60]. 
Some attempts have been made to include the criticality and detection of failure modes into 
the model, leading to the Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) [57], and 
Failure Mode Effect and Detection Analysis (FMEDA) [61], respectively. 
Risk-based inspection (RBI) is a process of developing a risk analysis scheme of in-
spection. It may include an assessment of the likelihood (probability) of failure due to 
flaws, damage, or deterioration or degradation, along with an assessment of the conse-
quences of such failure. 
A key concept is that of the Probability of Detection (POD), which was originally 
developed for the US Air Force focusing on turbine engine inspection [62]. The typical 
area of interest is cracks and flaws, for which the conventional parameters of interest are 
crack length and sometimes crack depth. However, there does not appear to have been 
any consideration of other parameters such as other defect types, image quality, inspector 
expertise, etc., nor has the POD concept evolved into a broader risk management frame-
work. Probability of detection in supply chains has been included in the risk equation by 
Griffis and Whipple [30], but not for defect detection in manufactured parts. 
While there has been some prior work on visual inspection, the literature is sparse 
on the application of risk frameworks to this area. For example, human factors were stud-
ied for borescope operators [63], but without quantifying the risks. Where risk assess-
ments have been used, they have been addressed to the implementation of new systems, 
rather than the inspection decisions themselves. For example, the authors of [64] provided 
a risk assessment for the implementation of the structural health monitoring, and simi-
larly, the authors of [65] for a detection procedure. 
2.3. Representation of Inspection Risk for Decision-Making 
All tabular approaches have in common that they multiply the failure likelihood, 
consequence, and any additional factors. To perform the calculation, numeric scales are 
required at input and output [21]. Ideally, these scales would represent consequences in a 
robust variable (such as economic utility, though even that fails to capture all dimensions 
of value), likelihood as a probability, and the output risk as a number to which people 
could relate. In practice, there are seldom sufficient data to quantify the input variables, 
and instead an ordered scale (e.g., from rare to almost certain) is used to which numerical 
values are assigned (e.g., 1 to 5) [28]. The numbers are then used in the product function, 
and the resulting risk score (RS), also called risk rating (RR), risk priority number (RPN), 
or risk value (RV), is mapped back to a descriptive scale (e.g., from low to extreme). All 
these processes introduce subjective judgements [22]. This, plus the variability in scales 
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used, make it difficult to compare risk assessments from different organisations. Pons [21] 
showed that this is also problematic for safety assessments, especially considering the 
need to reconcile these with legislative requirements (which vary across jurisdictions). 
An important aspect of risk management is the communication of the risks and iden-
tification of appropriate means of prevention and mitigation that address those risks. Typ-
ically, colour coding is used to highlight different risk levels, which enables a faster recep-
tion and identification of critical risks. 
Most common risk matrices use a traffic light system to colour risks from low or ac-
ceptable (green), over moderate or tolerable (amber), to high or intolerable risks (red) [66]. 
Some researchers have added yellow as another colour to their risk matrix, representing 
low risks in risk assessments that have large values for likelihood and impact, and typi-
cally these are non-linear scales [67,68]. 
In New Zealand and Australia, the handbook for risk management (HB 436:2004) 
suggests five colours: green, blue, yellow, orange, and red, in ascending order of risk lev-
els [69]. However, there is inconsistency with the order and allocation of these colours. 
While some follow the Australian and New Zealand standard (AS/NZS 4360) order [70], 
others follow the order of green-yellow-blue-red [71], and still others start with blue fol-
lowed by green, yellow, and red [72]. Vose introduced a graded colour scheme with nine 
colour tones [73]. Only a few risk levels with adjacent RPNs were assigned the same col-
our. Although the risk heat map consists of nine shades, it contains only four different 
colours, i.e., green, amber, orange, and red. Since some shades are so similar, it is hard to 
differentiate the associated risk levels from each other, which does not support the idea of 
an easier risk perception. As the author stated, it adds more complexity to a tool that was 
meant to simplify the risk assessment process. It can be concluded that too many colours 
are detrimental. Vose stated that managers need to know whether to say ‘Stop!’ or ‘Go!’ 
based on the risk involved [73]. Another way of specifying colours is by consideration of 
the intended audience. In most organisations, there is a progressive escalation of commu-
nication about risk depending on the risk appetite of the organisation. Thus, small risks 
might be treated by the operators, with larger risks progressively escalated to supervisors, 
managers, executives, board, and external regulators. Hence, the notion of risk might be 
portioned not so much into arbitrary colours, but into audiences and stakeholders [21]. 
Some risk assessment tools provide an icon-based rating, which is beneficial for colour-
blind people. The tool was used for risk rating biased assessment [74]. The different risk 
levels are as follows, with their associated icons shown in brackets: low (+), moderate (−), 
serious (x), and critical (!) [74,75]. 
2.4. Gaps in the Body of Knowledge Regarding Visual Inspection 
A two-dimensional risk matrix, while simple to understand, does not allow the com-
plex causality to be represented. This has given rise to an extensive literature on methods 
that multiply consequence, likelihood, and an additional contextual factor that is applica-
tion-specific. Most studies have included only a single third dimension. The work by Lu-
quetti Dos Santos et al. presents the idea of multiple performance-shaping factors [49]. 
However, they did not show how these factors could be included into the risk equation. 
There is a general lack of understanding as to how additional factors can be added to the 
risk assessment, especially if there is more than one application-specific factor. There are 
two primary issues. 
The first issue is the increasing risk score when adding (multiplying) additional fac-
tors. It is difficult to determine the relative importance or weighting of these factors. Often, 
they are given the same weighting as the likelihood and severity, which potentially leads 
to distorted results. To solve this, it is necessary to compensate for the additional factor. 
Thus, there is a need for a standardised approach to include one or more sub-factors into 
the risk equation, which should be as generic as possible to allow for its applicability to 
different industries. 
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The second issue is that all the risk assessment methods struggle to include factors 
that are difficult to quantify, such as human factors. While the presence of such factors is 
generally acknowledged [50,76–79], it remains problematic to quantify, or even identify 
an appropriate scale. 
Different risk assessment methods have been applied to the aviation industry and 
specifically to aircraft maintenance. These including Event Tree Analysis (ETA) [80], Bow-
tie Analysis [81], Maintenance Factors and Analysis Classification System (MxFACS) [11], 
and Failure Mode, Effect, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) combined with Fuzzy Logic, 
and the ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ (ALARP) approach [82]. Most commonly how-
ever, a tabular approach (risk register) is used for the risk assessment in the aviation do-
main, e.g., by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) [83,84], European Un-
ion Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) [85], Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) [86], or 
Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) [87]. However, these methods are applied in basic 
form, i.e., multiplying the probability and severity, with no considerations of additional 
factors affecting this risk score. Moreover, no previous study has examined the inherent 
risk in visual inspection tasks of aircraft engine components, and the factors that might 
influence the process and hence the risk. 
3. Methods 
3.1. Research Objective 
The research objective was to devise a standardised methodology for evaluating risk, 
in the specific area of visual inspection. The desired outcome was a generic framework for 
risk assessment with the following attributes: is clearly structured, can accommodate mul-
tiple application-specific factors, and can be applied to any industrial visual inspection 
task. The proposed framework is then applied to the specific case of visual inspection of 
defects in gas turbine blades. 
3.2. Approach 
The approach involved the lead author being embedded in MRO for the duration of 
the project. This experience provided contextual knowledge, and access to expert opera-
tors. Several work streams were undertaken, of an overlapping and mutually informing 
nature. The methodology was therefore developed around the industrial context. The con-
cepts were refined through an iterative process of theory building and testing of face va-
lidity in the industrial context. The workflow is presented in Figure 3 and each work 
stream is subsequently described in more detail. 




Figure 3. Research approach and workflow. 
3.2.1. Work Stream 1: Collection of Specimen Images 
A reference set of images was needed for ‘type’ defects. By ‘type’ we refer to a speci-
men, that represents a particular category and size of visual defect. The type image pre-
sents the defining features of that defect. This is semantically similar to how type is used 
in biology and within taxonomies. We adopted the taxonomy of blade defects per [88]. 
We then examined a large number of damaged blades, categorised per the defect taxon-
omy. Photographs of each defect type were taken with standardised image acquisition 
and lighting conditions to give a consistent image quality comparable to inspection with 
a low-magnification glass as available on inspection workbenches in the industry. The 
image acquisition was done with a Nikon D5200 digital single-lens reflex (DSLR) camera 
(Nikon Inc., Tokyo, Japan) and a Nikkor 105 mm micro-lens, in a self-built light tent with 
three 6 W Superlux (Superlux, Auckland, New Zealand) light-emitting diode (LED) ring 
lights. 
3.2.2. Work Stream 2: Design of Risk Framework 
Having identified the relevant factors for visual inspection, it was then necessary to 
design a conceptual framework to include these into a risk metric. 
3.2.3. Work Stream 3: Identification of Contextual Factors 
First, it was necessary to identify the factors involved in the visual inspection task. 
This was achieved by observation of the inspection process and communication with in-
dustry experts. Specifically, a visual inspection task always depends on how well the de-
fect is manifested in the view. Hence, the detectability or manifestation is a factor that 
needs to be included. See related work with Bowtie analysis [89]. We identified three pri-
mary factors: criticality, severity, and detectability. Criticality is the importance of the de-
fect type to be detected before the part is released back to service. Severity in turn de-
scribes the characteristics of the defect shape and probability of propagation towards a 
severe outcome. The manifestation represents the detectability of the defect in the present 
level of inspection. There is a correlation between the three factors. 
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3.2.4. Work Stream 4: Integration of Factors into an Inspection Risk Calculation and 
Method Validation 
The relationships between the three factors were analysed and expressed using a 
three-dimensional correlation matrix. Subsequently, the proposed method was applied to 
a case study in a MRO environment. A comparison between the traditional two-factor risk 
equation and the proposed three-factor approach was done by calculating the two risk 
scores for the selected defect samples. The most experienced industry expert then vali-
dated the veracity of the two results for each case and determined which one best repre-
sents the reality. We have high confidence in the validity of the experts’ ability to detect 
the ground truth, since the highly regulated nature of the aviation industry ensures that 
there is a hierarchy of inspection seniority based on passing a personal certification pro-
cess. 
4. Results 
4.1. Defect Taxonomy and Specimen Images 
The defect taxonomy was used from [88]. Specimen images for each defect are shown 
in Table 2. These represent a subset of a larger collection of images. 
Table 2. Sample images for each blade defect type. 






























4.2. A Generalised Model for Cofactors in Risk Assessment 
Inspection of the existing methodologies hints at a common underlying structure, 
whereby a consequence metric is multiplied by a likelihood metric, and then by a variety 
of other factors. Hence, to some extent, many of the methodologies follow an approximate 
ISO 31000 construct of risk, though they do not all use the consequence and likelihood 
metrics in precisely the same way (see Table 1). 
Therefore, we propose a general scheme for an extended risk assessment, whereby 
the basic structure follows the ISO 31000 framework of 𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶 × 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜, for 
continuity of interpretation. To this is appended a third ‘cofactor’. Hence: 
𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶 (𝐶𝐶) × 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜 (𝐿𝐿) × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (𝑋𝑋) (1) 
We propose that the cofactor runs from halving to doubling the risk, i.e., takes the 
range: 
𝐶𝐶 = [𝑥𝑥 | 0.5 ≤ 𝑥𝑥 ≤ 2.0] (2) 
The cofactor can vary according to the industry and application. Alternative termi-
nologies might be conditional, influence, situational, impact, or correction factors. 
The ‘cofactor’ (X) itself comprises any number of additional ‘contextual’ factors CF1, 
CF2, CF3, etc. These are determined based on the industrial context. The relationship be-
tween the cofactor and the contextual factors is determined by a correlation matrix. This 
calculation methodology is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Calculation methodology for the risk assessment. 
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Multiple contextual sub-factors can be assimilated in the cofactor, and for each appli-
cation, it would be necessary to determine how to do this, i.e., the algorithm need not be 
fixed. 
We interpret consequence as the harm or damage outcome to the overall system. 
Thus, the other terms for consequence are severity, impact, and loss. The likelihood de-
scribes the chances that an event results in these negative outcomes. Thus, in the example 
of Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), we would interpret its severity as a type of 
consequence, the probability as a likelihood metric, and the detection as a cofactor for the 
covertness of the failure mode. The same applies to the Failure Mode Effect and Criticality 
Analysis (FMECA), whereby the criticality is interpreted as the cofactor. 
The consequence and likelihood scales are not always continuous scales, but rather 
have discrete steps. Most frameworks have a five-step scale for consequence and likeli-
hood. Hence, for consistency, we propose that the maximum product of consequence and 
likelihood without the cofactor shall be about 50, however, that is arranged. Thus, for a 
context involving inspection of a defect, the risk scales would be as shown in Table 3. The 
consequence represents any adverse outcome that could occur if a defect stays undetected 
and propagates. The likelihood in turn describes the occurrence rate of such negative out-
come. The contextual factor represents variables that may influence the outcome (inspec-
tion accuracy in the present case). Ultimately, the contextual factor adjusts the risk score 
based on the reliability of the inspection. The resulting risk score can range from 0.5 to 
100. An overview of the risk scores and associated risk levels is presented in Table 4 and 
visualised as a three-dimensional risk matrix in Figure 5. 
Table 3. Proposed risk factor scales for an inspection process. 
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Table 4. Relationship between risk score (RS) and risk level (RL). 
Risk Score (RS) Risk Level (RL) Colour Scheme 
RS < 3 Minor  Green 
3 ≤ RS < 8 Low Yellow 
8 ≤ RS < 20 Moderate Orange 
20 ≤ RS < 50 High Red 
RS ≥ 50 Extreme Burgundy 
 
Figure 5. Three-dimensional risk matrix including cofactor. 
4.3. Contextual Factors in Visual Inspection 
In the case of visual inspection tasks, there are multiple contextual factors that need 
to be identified and then assimilated into a single risk cofactor. Visual inspection of air-
craft components is a complex task, since there are numerous internal and external varia-
bles, parameters, and conditions that may adversely affect the inspection. Thus, it is diffi-
cult to incorporate all factors. We therefore focused on those having the largest influence 
on the visual perception of the inspector, since the subsequent decision-making process is 
highly dependent on that perception. 
We determined the contextual factors by applying a Bowtie analysis [89], which in 
turn relied on discussion with experts. Hence, we propose three contextual factors for vis-
ual detection: 
1. The criticality of the defect if it stays undetected and the part is being released back 
to service, with the risk of propagating and cascading towards severe damage and 
harm. 
2. The severity and characteristics of the defect shape.  
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3. The ability to detect the defect with the selected inspection method before the engine 
returns to service. 
All three play a crucial role in the ability to detect a defect and the resulting decision-
making. The factors are elaborated below, and the integration into the overall risk equa-
tion is shown subsequently. Regarding the scales for the contextual factors, we decided to 
use scales with scores ranging from 1 to 5 rather than −2 to +2. This is because the combi-
nation of multiple negative numbers, e.g., in a product operation, results in confusion of 
signs in the outcome. 
4.3.1. Defect Class Type—Criticality Factor 
The seriousness level is determined by the risk of propagation during future opera-
tion and the ease of repairing the defect.  
There are twelve different types of defects that can occur on engine compressor 
blades [88], each with its own characteristics. Some defects are more critical than others, 
as they can lead to more severe damage and the propagation is much quicker, which 
means it can cause damage even before the next routine inspection. 
The approach taken was to understand the stress initiators (e.g., sharp bottoms) and 
stress pathways in the material based on the loading occurring in service. Since the depth 
of some surface defects, such as corrosion, on these type of blades is sometimes negligible 
and the blades may not even fail, the risk is relatively low to cause any negative outcome 
except for efficiency loss. It is also not a common type of defect found on this blade mate-
rial. 
The criticality scale is shown in Table 5 below. Defects with a high criticality were 
rated with a score of three, while critical defects were scored with two points, and less 
critical ones received a score of one.  






1 Low criticality 
Serviceable as long as the defect does not propagate to a 
more severe defect, e.g., a scratch might be acceptable, but 





Serviceability depending on defect location and severity. 
Often can be repaired. 
3 High criticality 
Parts need always be removed from service if this defect is 
found. Typically not repairable. 
The proposed criticality rating (Table 6) is based on the risk of failure and the poten-
tial of resulting in catastrophic outcomes. This includes consideration of several defect 
attributes. For instance, the location of where the defect commonly occurs plays an im-
portant role, i.e., defects on the edges are more critical than defects on the centre of the 
airfoil. Furthermore, the characteristics of the defect shape are taken into account, i.e., 
sharp defects propagate faster to more severe defects than smooth round bottom defects.  
Table 6. Criticality rating for each defect type. 
# Defect Type Criticality Rating 
1 Breaking 3 
2 Battered 3 
3 Tear 3 
4 Crack 3 
5 Bent 2 
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6 Nick 2 
7 Dent on edges 2 
8 Tip Curl 2 
9 Dent on airfoil 1 
10 Scratch 1 
11 Corrosion 1 
12 Tip Rub 1 
The most critical defects involve material separation, while the critical ones are char-
acterised by material deformation. Both criticality level two and three defects are typically 
found on the edges, which increases the severity further (see next section). Criticality level 
one defects however are typically found on the airfoil, the least critical blade area. The 
only exception is tip rub, which is caused by elongation of the blade under centrifugal 
forces during operation and is hence not foreign object-related. Since it is a known effect, 
it has been considered in the design phase when determining the life cycle of the part and 
thus the criticality is considered as being low despite some material deformation and re-
moval. 
4.3.2. Propagation Characteristics—Severity Factor 
It should be noted that in the area of aircraft engine inspection, there is a periodic 
inspection process at certain intervals. Hence, the question is not so much whether an 
undetected defect will be released to service, but rather whether that defect might propa-
gate to catastrophic outcomes before the next service. This complicates things because it 
requires that regard be given to the type of defect and its propagation characteristics. 
Severity represents the potential for the defect to grow to catastrophic outcomes be-
fore the next maintenance inspection. It takes into account the size of the defect, catego-
rised by type of defect. For example, a long crack is more likely than a small edge nick to 
propagate to complete engine destruction before the next inspection, and hence has higher 
severity. In contrast, a surface defect such as a scratch or corrosion has low severity. When 
assessing severity, the inspector uses their expertise and training to evaluate how severe 
the outcomes would be, if the defect under examination was not repaired or replaced. 
We propose the concept of retained defect to represent a condition that is not treated 
but instead passes back into service. The defect could be retained for many reasons: be-
cause the inspector judged it to be small (that judgement could be correct or wrong), or it 
was not visible with the technology available (borescope resolution is limited), the part 
was too dirty to see it, or it was not apparent from that view. Several of these are covered 
by the other contextual factors, and hence there is correlation between the factors (ex-
plored later). 
The proposed severity scoring scale is presented in Table 7 below. A minor defect has 
a low probability of progressing to severe engine failure before the next engine shop visit 
(score of one), while a large defect has a high severity (score of three).  





1 Low severity 
Retained defect will not cause an engine failure before the next shop visit 
(6–12,000 cycles). 
2 Moderate severity 
Defect has the potential to increase and propagate towards a more severe 
damage and has the potential to cause engine failure during test or 
operation. The latter can lead to loss of engines, aircraft, and even lives. 
3 High severity 
Obvious defects that can cause damage to the engine and test cell, or 
subsequently in service cause severe damage and harm to aircraft, engine 
or passengers. 
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The primary categorisation of severity is again by defect type, see Table 8. Note that 
some defects have no level one severity, as they are: (a) not visually detectable at this level 
e.g., micro-cracks, or (b) because they are progressions of other pre-existing defect types, 
e.g., a teared, battered, or broken blade. Likewise, for some defects, there might not be a 
level three, e.g., for corrosion, since the blades are made of titanium and the corrosion is 
merely of the surface deposits. 
Table 8. Severity levels of growth factors. 
Defect 
Type 
Severity Level 1 Severity Level 2 Severity Level 3 







Breaking Refer to level 3 Nick 
 
 






Typically, deposits on 
the blade corrode and 
not the blade material, 
which is why it is 
superficial and no level 3 
exists 





























As the table shows, the more severe defects are visually pronounced, and have a high 
likelihood of being detected under favourable viewing conditions.  
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4.3.3. Detection of the Defect—Detectability Factor 
Detectability refers to the extent to which the defect is visible to the inspector. The 
main parameters are (a) the level of disassembly, and (b) the viewing angle that the oper-
ator has of the defect. 
There are different levels of inspection before and during an engine shop visit, start-
ing with on-wing in-situ borescope inspection, followed by module inspection, and on-
bench piece-part inspection. Each inspection method allows additional views of the part 
compared to the previous one. Hence, there is a relationship between camera view and 
level of disassembly. The higher the level of disassembly, the higher the part exposure, 
and hence the more camera views are possible. Some defects are simply not visible from 
certain directions or at certain stages of disassembly. 
Defects vary in shape and appearance, and hence there is a need to better understand 
which views are beneficial for each type of defect. An unfortunate view may lead to miss-
ing an important defect even by an expert inspector. Thus, it is even more critical when 
the level of expertise is low and the defect is not presented in the best possible way. 
Representative Blade Views 
Eight representative blade views were chosen in a way that all relevant areas that 
need to be inspected during visual in-situ inspection of engine blades are covered. The 
designation of those views is: leading edge 1 (LE1), leading edge 2 (LE2), concave airfoil 
1 (CC1), concave airfoil 2 (CC2), trailing edge 1 (TE1), trailing edge 2 (TE2), convex airfoil 
1 (CX1), and convex airfoil 2 (CX2). For better understanding, the acronyms of the relevant 
views and the viewing directions towards the blade are shown in Figure 6a,b below. The 
diagram serves only the purpose of illustrating the different views. Since the airfoil is 
curved and twisted, a simplified but not-to-scale representation was chosen. The acro-
nyms are used in the following sections. 
 
 
(a) Isometric View (b) Top View 
Figure 6. Schematic presentation of the different blade perspectives and its acronyms. (a) Isometric presentation of the 
blade, (b) presentation of the blade from the top. 
The idea of detectability is included in the literature, though not specifically applied 
to visual orientation as it is here. For example, Youssef et al. defined the detectability as 
‘the likelihood of discovering and correcting a hazard or failure mode’ [28]. During in-
spection of parts, either in the manufacturing process or during a maintenance repair and 
overhaul (MRO) process, the viewing angle of either the camera or the human eye and the 
illumination have a major effect on the appearance of anomalies and defects. 
Lee et al. [90] previously discussed this phenomenon in the manufacturing process 
of injection-moulded parts. Detection of defects, such as cracks, scratches, or finishes, are 
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dependent on the viewing angle and incidence of light. Likewise, Zhang et al. [91,92] em-
phasised the same effects during inspection of highly specular reflective (HSR) surfaces, 
such as of chrome-plated parts. Reflection on engine blades is less common since these 
parts, made of titanium and some with a ceramic coating, are often discoloured or covered 
with deposits, and thus illumination might be less critical. In a manual inspection process, 
the inspector can move the part relatively to the light source and their eyes, but this is not 
possible with photographs. In borescope inspection the light source and the camera are 
always in line—this is a design constraint. 
There is a correlation between the view that the operator has of the defect, and the 
type of defect. We approached this as follows. 
Defect View Scale 
A camera view comparison was made to determine the best views showing the defect 
under investigation. The evaluation of the view suitability was made based on the per-
ception of industry experts and verified by the actual defect dimensions as visible from 
that particular view. 
We prepared a set of photographs comprising different views of a variety of defects. 
These images were shown to the inspection experts (N = 2). We then asked them to rate 
the viewing positions based on a rating scale from most unfavourable (3) to most favour-
able (1), as shown in Table 9 below. Between them, the experts had 45 years of experience. 
One expert did the first evaluation, and the second reviewed and approved the scores. It 
shall be noted that the scale is inverse, i.e., a high detectability receives a low score as 
missing the defect is low. Likewise, a low detectability results in a high risk score. 





Description Confidence  
of Detection 









inspection (DET), i.e., 
on-bench piece-part 
inspection 
2 Moderate detectability 
Defect type just 
detectable ≈50% 
General visual 






but not sure 
whether it is a 
defect 
<25% General borescope 
inspection (GBI) 
We added the level of disassembly to the table as this might help industry select the 
appropriate detectability score. 
The verification was done by using a software that measures the defect size visible 
on the photograph (in pixels) for each view [93]. The results were than compared and a 
ranking was made based on the visible defect size. 
Correlation Between View and Type of Defects 
The ratings given by the experts for each type of defect and viewing angle are pre-
sented in Table 10. 
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Table 10. Correlation table of expert rating of image acquisition view for each defect type. 
Defect Type  CC1 CC2 LE1 LE2 CX1 CX2 TE1 TE2 
Battered 2 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 
Bent 2 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 
Breaking 1 1 2 1 1 2 3 1 
Corrosion 1 1 3 1 1 1 3 1 
Crack 1 1 3 1 1 1 2 2 
Dent on Airfoil 1 1 2 3 3 3 1 1 
Dent on LE 2 1 1 1 3 3 3 1 
Nick 1 1 1 2 1 1 3 2 
Scratch 1 1 3 1 1 1 3 1 
Tear 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 
Tip Curl 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 
Tip Rub 1 2 3 1 1 1 3 1 
It can be concluded from the scores that defects that have a stronger three-dimen-
sional shape on the edges, such as teared or battered blades, can be detected from most 
angles, whereas surface defects have less views from which they can be seen. 
Implications are that the view needs to be selected for the type of defect being sought. 
For example, the best perspective to detect a crack is the CX1 view, but this is relatively 
poor for bent or battered defects. Generally, it will be necessary to have multiple views. If 
only one view is possible, then the results identify it as CC2. 
4.4. Inspection Risk Calculation 
To recap, our objective is to determine the multiple sub-factors that make up the co-
factor for the risk equation. Having identified three sub-factors for blade inspection (crit-
icality, severity, and detectability), it is now necessary to identify the relationships be-
tween them. 
4.4.1. Determination of the Cofactor for Blade Visual Inspection 
Multiplication of the factors is the most common approach when calculating a risk 
score. However, other mathematical operations, such as the power law, can be applied as 
well [47]. In the case of four dimensions, the risk has been calculated by the volume of the 
pyramid [39]. The literature shows that another way to solve the problem of combining 
multiple scales can be to use a nomogram. This graphical method involves constructing 
lines between points on multiple scales, with the intersections then giving the output var-
iable. They were once popular for sizing engineering componentry in an era before com-
puting power, as they obviated the need for the complexity of using slide rules. A novel 
application of a nomogram to safety has more recently been shown by Amirshenava and 
Osanloo for mine closure risk [94]. Nonetheless, nomograms do require an explicit algo-
rithm for their construction, even if that is not apparent in the graphical representation. 
Hence, they were not considered further here. Instead, we proceeded with a correlation 
matrix between the three factors. 
In a first step, the relationship between criticality and severity was represented as a 
product operation. We justify this on the basis that each of these factors makes the other 
worse. With a three-level ordinal scale for each, the resulting scores range from 1 to 9 (see 
Figure 7). 




Figure 7. Defect criticality and severity matrix if scales are equal. 
The issue that arises with this approach is that different combinations can result in 
the same overall score. For instance, a non-critical defect of criticality level 1 but with a 
level 3 severity rating would mathematically result in the same score as a highly critical 
defect (level 3) of minor severity (level 1). In practice however, this is not the case, as a 
critical defect, such as a cracked, teared, battered, or broken blade, always needs to be 
removed from service, independent of the severity level. This problem becomes even 
more apparent when adding a third dimension to the contextual factor matrix, as there is 
an increase in combinations available, obtaining the same score. Therefore, the scales need 
to be adjusted for the subsequent calculation. 
The solution we propose is to adjust the weighting. Thus, the criticality, being the 
most important factor, is given the largest weighting, followed by the severity and detect-
ability. Hence, criticality is rated 1 to 10, severity 1 to 5, and detectability 1 to 3. 
Therefore, the Contextual Factor Score becomes: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹)𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 =  
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶)  ×  𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶)  ×  𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣) 
(3) 
Similar to the risk matrix, the three contextual factors influencing the inspection and 
decision-making process can be visualised as a three-dimensional matrix (Figure 8). The 
scores can range from 1 to 150. The higher the score resulting from Equation (3), the higher 
the influence on the inspection risk. An extended colour scheme was introduced to visu-
alise the different levels, reaching from minor (green), low (yellow), moderate (orange), 
high (red), and extreme (burgundy). The resulting cofactor that is fed back into the generic 
risk equation (Equation (1)) can be retrieved from the right column of the correlation ma-
trix shown in Table 11. 





Action by borescope inspector Cofactor 
Score 
1–4 Minor Green No action required 0.5 
5–14 Low Yellow Flag for next service 0.8 
15–29 Moderate Orange Monitor – recheck after x hrs 1.0 
30–74 High Red Remove as soon as possible 1.5 
75–150 Extreme Burgundy 
Immediate removal of engine 
from service 2.0 




Figure 8. Contextual factor matrix. 
4.4.2. Case Study 
The proposed framework was tested and validated by applying it to a case study of 
high-pressure compressor (HPC) blades of gas turbine engines. This includes sample 






Figure 9. Sample blades with different defects highlighted with red markings. (a) Borescope image of high-pressure com-
pressor (HPC) stage 8 blade with nick on leading edge. (b) Same blade as in (a) but this time presented as during on-bench 
piece-part inspection. (c) Airfoil dents on an HPC stage 8 blade in boroscopic view. (d) Broken-off leading edge corner of 
a high-pressure turbine (HPT) stage 1 blade. 
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First, the traditional two-factor method was applied to calculate the overall risk score 
(RS) for all four blade samples by multiplying the consequence and likelihood. This re-
sulted in the following risk scores: Blade (a) and (b) 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 = 8  (2 × 4), blade (c) 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 =
5 (1 × 5), and blade (d) 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 = 6 (2 × 3). 
Subsequently, the risk scores for the same blades were determined using the new 
approach, which takes into account the contextual factors (criticality, severity, and detect-
ability). The defect type was classified as nick and thus the criticality score was 5 (level 2). 
Its deformation is quite severe and therefore received a score of 5 (level 3). Both the criti-
cality and severity score are the same for image (a) and (b), since it is the same blade. 
However, Figure 9a shows the boroscopic representation where the defect is quite difficult 
to detect, whereas in the piece-part representation, the defect can hardly be missed (Figure 
9b). Therefore, Figure 9a has a detectability score of 3 (level 3), whereas Figure 9b has a 
score of 1 (level 1). 
Multiplying the contextual factors following Equation (3), the resulting cofactor is 75 
and 25 for Figure 9a, b, respectively. Applying the correlation matrix (Table 11), the cofac-
tor for Figure 9a is 2.0 and is 1.0 for Figure 9b. This shows not only that the overall risk 
scores differ to the one of the traditional risk approach, but also that the risk can be differ-
ent for the same blade and defect at different levels of inspection (borescope vs. piece-
part). 
The conditions shown in Figure 9c are two dents on the airfoil and therefore the crit-
icality factor equals 1. The defect is presented in the CC1 view (perpendicular to the sur-
face). Since this is the ideal perspective for airfoil dents, it is highly detectable and receives 
a detectability score of 1. The defect is of moderate size and thus equals severity level 2. 
The CF score is 2 and the resulting cofactor score is 0.5. This indicates that the defect does 
not affect the safety of aircraft operation, which was confirmed by the industry experts. If 
such a defect is detected during borescope inspection, the engine does not require a costly 
teardown or further inspection. This is the result of the proposed framework, whereas the 
traditional approach would have resulted in a twice as high risk score and possible differ-
ent maintenance and disassembly decision. 
In some cases, such as the blade presented in Figure 9b, the cofactor score equals 1.0 
and the proposed three-factor approach results in the same risk score as the traditional 
two-factor method. This demonstrates that the traditional risk approach is still accurate in 
some cases (where the cofactor equals 1.0). 
We wanted to show that the proposed inspection risk approach is also applicable to 
other engine blades and parts and therefore included a turbine blade in the case study 
(Figure 9d). The defect is a broken-off corner of the blade with a criticality score of 10 (level 
3), a severity score of 5 (level 2), and a detectability score of 1 (level 1). The resulting con-
textual factor score is 50 (10 × 5 × 1), which translates to a cofactor score of 1.5. This leads 
to an overall risk score of 9 (2 × 3 × 1.5). While this particular example shows a defect 
type that is common on both HPC and HPT blades, there are other defects that only occur 
on HPT blades and that need to be added to the score lists. Nonetheless, it is possible to 
apply the same principles and risk equations to any other engine parts. 
4.4.3. Go/No-Go Matrix 
In some cases, a five-level scoring system is not effective and a simplified version 
might be required, for example in situations where a decision has to be made. This is read-
ily accommodated by reducing the decision factor categories down to two, namely ‘go’ 
and ‘no-go’. The threshold can be adjusted based on the company’s risk-appetite. ‘Go’ 
means that the inspection conditions are good enough to make a sufficiently reliable de-
cision as to whether or not to strip down the engine and perform a more detailed inspec-
tion. ‘No-go’, in contrast, shows that the decision cannot be made with certainty. The re-
lationship between the decision factor score and decision output is shown in Table 12, and 
the resulting three-dimensional go/no-go matrix is presented in Figure 10. 
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Table 12. Relationship between decision factor and decision output. 
Risk Score Decision Output Colour 
1–29 Go Green 
30–150 No-go Red 
 
Figure 10. Three-dimensional go/no-go matrix. 
4.4.4. Optimal Viewing Perspectives 
When working in an environment with time pressure, such as in aviation maintenance, 
it is often not practical to take several recordings of a single part, especially if there are hun-
dreds of parts that need to be inspected. Hence, there was an interest to identify the most 
favourable views to capture as many defects with as few perspectives as possible. 
The above method lends itself to this. The multiple views can be analysed using the 
risk assessment to give a score for criticality and detectability. The view with the highest 
score is best. This process can be repeated for the range of defect types, to determine over-
all scores, or scores for specific types of defect (e.g., nicks). This information may then be 
used to determine which views to prioritise as part of the organisational quality manage-
ment system. Results for the blades in this dataset are shown in Table 13. 
Table 13. Weighted factor analysis for different viewing perspectives. 
Defect Type CR 
CC1 CC2 LE1 LE2 CX1 CX2 TE1 TE2 
DR WS DR WS DR WS DR WS DR WS DR WS DR WS DR WS 
Battered 3 3 9 4 12 4 12 4 12 2 6 4 12 5 15 4 12 
Bent 2 3 6 4 8 1 2 4 8 2 4  4 8 5 10 4 8 
Breaking 3 5 15 4 12 3 9 5 15 5 15 3 9 2  6 4 12 
Corrosion 1 5 5 5 5 2 2 4 4 5 5 5 5 2  2 5 5 
Crack 3 4 12 4 12 2 6 4 12 5 15 4 12 3 9 3 9 
Dent on Airfoil 1 4 4 5 5 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 
Dent on LE 2 3 6 5 10 5 10 4 8 2 4 2 4 1 2 4 8 
Nick 2 5 10 4 8 4 8 3 6 5 10 4 8 2 4 3 6 
Scratch 1 5 5 4 4 1 1 4 4 5 5 4 4 1 1 4 4 
Tear 3 4 12 4 12 3 9 5 15 4 12 5 15 3 9 5 15 
Tip Curl 2 3  6 4 8 5 10 4 8 3 6 4 8 3 6 3 6 
Tip Rub 1 2 2 5 5 2 2 5 5 4 4 5 5 2 2 5 5 
Overall Score   92  101  74  98  87  91  70  94 
The results show that when choosing a minimum set of views to cover all areas of 
the blade, CC2 and CX2 combined have the greatest potential to cover all defect types, 
locations, and severity levels. CC2 combined with CC1/LE2/TE2 would have given a 
higher total score, but would not have covered all blade regions. 
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In some cases, it is known that an engine has experienced a particular event, e.g., bird 
strike, ‘lucky’ coin ingestion, or volcanic ash, in which case it becomes possible, knowing 
the types of defects that arise, to determine which views would be most effective to view 
any damage. 
For all defects that involve material separation or removal such as scratches, tip rub, 
nicks, cracks, and breaking, an airfoil view (CC1, CC2, CX1, and CX2) is beneficial. For all 
defects that involve material deformation and change of shape, such as tip curl, tears, 
dents on the leading edges, bents, and battered blades, edge views (LE1, LE2, TE2) are 
beneficial. For all defects that occur on the airfoil surface, such as corrosion, scratches, and 
dents on airfoil, a concave view (CC1 and CC2), and dependent on the severity, also a 
convex view (CX1 and CX2), can provide a good detection. 
Dents 
The appearance and detectability of dents is highly dependent on where the defect is 
located on the part and on the level of severity. For example, dents on the leading edge 
are never entirely on the vertex of the edge. The foreign object that hit the blade continues 
its pathway on either the convex or the concave side of the blade. View LE1 is always good 
but dependent on the trajectory of the foreign object, sometimes view LE2 is the best, and 
some other times, perspective CC2 is the best to see the damage. In contrast, a dent on the 
airfoil highly depends on the severity for its detectability. 
Tears 
The detectability of tears depends on the location and severity. In some cases, the tear 
evolved in a way that it is not detectable (as a tear) but rather looks like a nick. This is 
because a nick often pre-exists and evolves into a tear over time. Hence, a nick can be the 
preceding defect from which a tear evolves. Thus, the defect may not be detectable in the 
TE1 view, although this is the position where the defect is closest to the camera sensor. In 
other cases, this is the best view. Hence, it is difficult to determine a standard view here. 
We decided to choose a “good view” (LE2) as a somewhat ideal view, knowing that in 
some cases, there might be a better view, but this one is the one whereby the defect can 
always be seen. The same counts for LE1. 
Nicks 
The situation with nicks is similar to tears. The best view highly depends on how the 
defect was formed and its severity level. 
5. Discussion 
5.1. Summary of Outcomes 
This work provides a universal framework for risk assessments that incorporates a third 
dimension into the risk equation, the so-called cofactor. This factor represents the industrial 
context, and can comprise multiple sub-factors that are application-specific. A method has 
been devised, including appropriate scales, for the inclusion of these into the risk assessment. 
A traffic light colour scheme was applied to visualise the different risk levels. 
A simplification of the framework provides a method for go/no-go decision-making, 
which is more relevant to industry practitioners, who need a more black-and-white ap-
proach, since any grey will cause inconsistency and potentially an incorrect decision. 
In principle, the proposed method allows to add an unlimited number of contextual 
factors to the risk equation. The contextual factors are summarised (normalised) into one 
cofactor using a correlation matrix. This is necessary to avoid that the total risk score does 
not increase infinitely and that adding more contextual factors does not outweigh the like-
lihood and consequence component, i.e., the number of contextual factors does not affect 
the risk score. 
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The proposed framework was applied to a case study in the aircraft engine mainte-
nance domain. The contextual factors relevant for the specific case of visual inspection of 
engine blades were identified as being criticality, severity, and detectability. Appropriate 
scales were devised and the new framework was validated by experts in the field. 
We suggest that factors that affect the risk can have a negative but also a positive 
effect. For instance, under ideal inspection conditions such as the ones in on-bench inspec-
tion, the risk of missing a defect is much lower than, for example, in borescope inspection, 
where the environment is more difficult and thus the overall risk score needs to be higher. 
5.2. Implications for Practitioners 
The proposed framework was tested and validated in the specific area of visual in-
spection of gas turbine engine blades. The generic structure, however, allows for applica-
tion of the risk framework to other inspection and quality assurance tasks within and out-
side the aviation sector. Likewise, it is applicable to any other process within the aviation 
maintenance domain and beyond. It might be of particular interest to other error-prone 
high-reliability organisations (HROs), including nuclear power, oil and gas, mining, or 
healthcare [89], as the understanding of risk and safety in those industries is of utmost 
importance. This generic framework not only allows for the integration of human factors 
into the well-known 𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶 × 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜  risk equation, but also supports the 
standardisation of risk assessment across different organisations and industries. 
The go/no-go matrix can be generalised and applied to other applications outside 
quality assurance, since decisions have to be made in any area. For example, a company 
might decide whether to invest into a certain product or market based on the inherent risk 
and the company’s risk appetite. In project management, one could think of a project that 
is exposed to increased risk and the project manager needs to make a call if the project 
shall continue as planned or needs to be adjusted to the changed circumstances. 
One of the most important aspects of risk assessment is the effective communication of 
those [95,96]. If risks cannot be communicated properly so that stakeholders understand the 
need to implement new means of prevention and mitigation, or reinforce existing ones, and 
understanding which risks are most critical, then the entire risk calculation and assessment 
is of little use. Thus, applying a traffic light system, or a go/no-go system, although done 
before, can support such risk communication and make it more understandable to people 
throughout the organisation. Consistency of quality expectations across an organisation, 
and between organisations, is important in high-reliability systems. 
Adding contextual factors to the risk equation requires the involvement of shop floor 
staff in the risk assessment process to identify the important factors, since they are the 
ones with the best understanding of the context. Furthermore, the quantification of those 
factors often relies on expert judgement, when historical data might be scarce or simply 
not available. Thus, it is beneficial if the context expert (in our case the visual inspection 
expert) can perform or at least support the risk assessment and provide an ‘as good as 
possible’ estimate. This collaboration between the risk analyst and shop floor staff might 
have several benefits, including increased awareness and better understanding of the in-
herent risks of the specific application due to improved communication between the risk 
analyst and workforce, as well as buy-in for changes to reduce those risks. Potentially, the 
generic and simple structure may even allow non-risk analysts to perform a risk assess-
ment themselves. 
5.3. Limitations 
The framework proposed here could do with more validation. Potentially, this might 
take the form of a larger study whereby the ground truth was established for multiple blades 
(by expert assessment), and the risk determined. The detection accuracy from the confusion 
matrix (false positive/false negative) has not been determined and would be a useful step 
forward. Alternatively, it could be interesting to track one defective blade through the vari-
ous work inspection stages, i.e., undertake a longitudinal study of the risk. 
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The time component of failure has only partly been accommodated in this framework. 
Some defects may change criticality over time when they propagate towards more severe 
defects, for example, a nick can become a tear or crack, which can cause a blade to break. 
Although one benefit of the proposed framework is that there is no restriction for the 
number of contextual factors, this is one of the drawbacks at the same time. In this specific 
case study of visual inspection, three contextual factors were identified. However, in other 
cases, there might be more or less factors, or the factor scales might be different, and thus 
the contextual factor scores may vary. Therefore, an adjustment of the correlation matrix 
based on the number of contextual factors and scores is needed. Such uniform scaling 
approach has yet not been devised and could be the scope of future work. 
The weighting of the scales used for the three contextual factors in this research were 
adjusted to the specific case. As highlighted in Section 4.4.1, the use of equal and linear 
scales, would have resulted in risk scores that derive from the reality and thus needed to 
be adjusted. Applying the risk framework to other industries is possible, but scales may 
need adjustment. The framework is flexible enough to cope with those variations in scales 
and the resulting contextual factor scores, providing the correlation matrix is adjusted. 
The modified risk equation might be of limited use in situations where the contextual 
factors or the scales thereof are difficult to quantify. This could be either because of the 
lack of historic data or the inability of providing estimates by the industry experts. 
The three-dimensional risk cube with its traffic light colour coding might be a helpful 
visualisation and support the communicating risks to stakeholders. While it may work 
well for the overall risk score comprising three factors (likelihood, consequence, and co-
factor), it might not be applicable for the contextual factors level, as there might be more 
than three sub-factors, which will be difficult to express visually. 
5.4. Future Research Opportunities 
There are several directions for future research. Firstly, there is a knowledge dimen-
sion to any risk assessment [44]. We believe this aligns with the expertise and experience 
of the operator and hence could be included in the risk framework. 
Secondly, Hameed et al. introduced a risk-based approach for optimising shutdown 
inspection and maintenance including human errors and human error probabilities, 
whereby the authors introduced performance-shaping factors (PSF) related to the perfor-
mance of the human operator [97]. These include factors such as training, experience, time 
pressure, work memory, and work environment, among others. Potentially, these ideas 
might be applied to the current situation.  
Thirdly, as mentioned above, sometimes the engine under examination is known to 
have experienced an incident such as bird strike, in which case, Bayesian methods (con-
ditional probabilities) might be used to determine the likelihood of undetected damage 
given the views available for inspection. 
Lastly, as explained in the Limitations Section, an adjustment of the correlation ma-
trix might be needed if the number of contextual factors or their scale values change. This 
could be done by proving percentages rather than absolute numbers in the left column of 
the correlation matrix (Table 11). The contextual factor score levels could then be calcu-
lated by multiplying the percentages with the maximum achievable score, which equals 
the product of the highest value of each scale. 
6. Conclusions 
This work makes several novel contributions. The first one is of philosophical nature 
in that it is proposed that many risk assessments may be reduced to three factors: conse-
quence, likelihood, and a cofactor. The latter represents the industrial context, and can 
comprise multiple sub-factors. 
The second contribution is the identification of three factors that are relevant to visual 
inspection: criticality, severity, and detectability. Associated with those are a variety of 
scales for their measurement, and a method to combine them into the risk calculation. This 
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generic framework has the potential to support standardisation in risk assessment to 
counteract the high variation among different organisations and industries. It has been 
tested on visual inspection of jet engine blades, but we believe that the principles are 
adaptable to other inspection tasks. Moreover, due to its generic structure, the risk frame-
work might be applicable to other industries and applications as well. 
Another contribution is in the form of a go/no-go matrix that has been devised to 
support the decision-making process, wherever a clear answer is required and a maybe is 
not acceptable. One finding worth mentioning is that risk scores do not always have to 
increase when adding additional factors, but can also decrease, depending on the positive 
or negative impact those factors have. 
A fourth contribution is specific to blades, and the identification of the views for 
which defects are most visible. In practice, the usefulness of this is more likely to be in its 
corollary: knowing what incident an engine has experienced, what is the likelihood that 
any associated defects will be visible? While this paper does not completely answer this 
question, it provides a method by which it ought to be possible. 
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